This paper analyses currency options for six Pacific states -Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu -that issue their own currencies. Empirical estimates indicate that these states already stabilize their currencies against the US dollar because of their large and increasing trade with emerging Asia which denominates its trade in US dollars. Building on the theory of an optimal peg, we argue that the replacement of present currencies by the US dollar would strengthen these countries' trade. Gravity model estimations indicate that adopting a common external currency would be a major stimulus to Pacific trade. While the Australian dollar has been suggested because of the Pacific's traditional trade relations with Australia this choice would be the result of a reverse causality bias. A binary choice method is applied to trace endogeneity biases in the Pacific sample. The gains for trade from the adoption of an external currency are lower but remain positive.
Introduction
Analyses of Pacific development widely agree that despite large aid flows, living standards have improved only slightly since independence in the 1970s (Hughes 2003 , Stewart 2006 , Hughes and Sodhi 2008 . Most Pacific states are richly endowed with agricultural land, marine and mineral resources and tourist sites. They are also well located close to the burgeoning markets of East Asia. Trade is thus a potential driver of economic development in the Pacific. Stable exchange rates can deliver macroeconomic stability and reduce transaction costs such as currency conversion (McKinnon 1979 , European Commission 1990 , Rose 2000 , McKinnon and Schnabl 2004 . This paper examines the trade effects of the replacement of individual Pacific currencies by a single anchor currency. Following Frankel and Wei (1994) our econometric estimates indicate that the US dollar dominates the Pacific currency baskets.
Two possible directions of causality are examined to determine an optimal currency for the Pacific. Firstly, causality can run from trade towards the choice of an anchor currency. The theory of the optimal peg (Black 1976 , Crocket and Nsouli 1977 and Connolly 1983 (Anderson 1979 and Rose 2000) dating from 1990 to 2005 is applied. Pacific islands that already use external currencies are taken as a control group. The gravity model estimates show a large and significant effect of adopting an external currency on Pacific trade. These results, however, are likely to be biased upwards by reverse causality bias. A common currency could have been established because Pacific trade with the anchor currency country was already high as argued by the optimal peg theory. Binary choice methods are hence employed to trace possible endogeneity biases. By modelling 'statistical twins' from treated observations and control group observations, the positive effect of a common currency on trade is reduced but remains positive and statistically significant. The paper is organized as follows: section two examines directions of trade and monetary regimes in the Pacific; the third section models the optimal choice of an anchor currency; section four quantifies the effect of the adoption of external currencies on trade relations with a special focus on endogeneity biases; section five concludes with policy recommendations.
Current Trade and Monetary Regimes
The Pacific's range of exports is narrow, being concentrated in tourism, agricultural products, and minerals (CIA World Fact Book 2009 ). Fiji's principal exports are tourism, sugar and garments. Papua New Guinea exports gold, petroleum, copper, timber and coffee. Samoa's exports are marine products, copra and coconut oil. Tonga exports marine products, timber and vegetables. Vanuatu exports copra, beef and cocoa. The Pacific's imports, however, consist of a highly diversified range of manufactures and services from Australia, China, Japan, South Korea, France or the United Kingdom. Pacific currency baskets may be pegged to the currencies of principal trading partners, major world currencies or currencies of former colonial powers. We regress the exchange rates of six Pacific currencies on the Australian dollar, the Japanese yen, the euro (French franc 1 ), the US dollar and the pound sterling applying the Swiss franc as a numeraire:
(1) Guinea kina (0.17) and Samoan tala (0.01) might be explained by phases of imprudent monetary policy in these countries that are also indicated by the low frequency data in Figure   5 .
As a robustness test we analyze the composition of the currency baskets over time applying a rolling regression approach. Rolling 130-day coefficients are plotted for the six Pacific currencies. The 130-day window includes daily data for about four months (7-day weeks).
The first window starts on October 23, 1995 and ends on February 29, 1996. After the coefficient for the first window is calculated, the window is shifted by one day. The positive trade effects of a common currency were seen to be largely explained by a reduction in such transaction costs as currency conversion and exchange rate uncertainty. Emerson et al. (1992) showed that currency conversion costs are particularly large for small countries. Because their currencies are seldom traded internationally, costs of conversion are relatively high.
Exchange rate uncertainty implies costs of unexpected price changes in tradable goods.
Hedging the risk of exchange rate changes by derivates, such as forward contracts is costly and elements of risk remain. As stated by McKinnon (1979) the exporter never knows the exact future dates of sales. Forward contracts can reduce, but not fully cover currency risks.
Kenen (2002) Lipschitz (1979) has indicated that an anchor currency should be chosen by trade invoicing rather than by directions of trade.
Empirical Estimations
We first evaluate the effect of a common currency on trade for the six Pacific states applying a standard gravity model framework (Rose 2000) . Secondly, possible endogeneity biases are addressed by a binary choice approach following Persson (2001) . Economic gravity models relate bilateral trade ties to economic masses, geographical distance and a number of control variables based on Newton's law of universal gravitation. The gravity model finds trade ties between two countries to increase, the closer the countries are located and the larger their economic size. We apply a standard gravity equation of the following specification:
Variable TRADE ijt represents the magnitude of bilateral trade between country i and country j .
The dependent variable is measured by the logged arithmetic average of the two bilateral trade flows of the country pair (exports and imports) at time t. The economic mass of each country pair at time t is measured by the logged product of its GDPs g ijt . The logged product of each country pairs GDPs per capita, variable gc ijt accounts for the level of economic development. As usual in the literature we measure distance d by the great circle formula that calculates distances by latitudes and longitudes of the capital or the largest city of each country as the crow flies.
We add a set of binary control variables, including common currency, common language, common colonial history and trade diversion to the estimation equation, which take the following shape:
The common currency dummy is unity when both countries belong to the same currency area.
Two countries that speak the same language or have a common colonial history have closer trade relations because of lower transaction costs. 2 The trade diversion dummy also introduced by Rose (2000) is unity if one country has an external currency, otherwise it is zero. Only if the coefficient of the dummy is significantly negative would it indicate a trade diversion effect within a common currency area. The error variable is ε ijt .
The common currency dummy in estimation (2) is plagued with severe endogeneity biases.
Prior research (Persson 2001 , Tenreyo 2001 , Alesina et al. 2002 and Smith 2002 ) assumes reverse causality in the common currency coefficients. It is argued that country pairs with strong bilateral trade ties might have adopted a currency union endogenously to strengthen 2 We have not applied a free trade arrangement dummy because most Pacific states are members of inter-Pacific and extra-Pacific trade arrangements. Many industrial countries have given preferential market access to the Pacific states (Freitag 2006) . As the dummy takes the value one for nearly all observations, the information content of a free trade arrangement dummy is limited in a Pacific context.
bilateral trade as also argued by the optimal peg theory. A currency union reduces transaction costs and thereby fosters bilateral trade ties.
Subtracting possible endogeneity biases from equation (2) The second instrument for identifying possible reverse causality biases is a binary choice or matching technique following Persson (2001) . Based on a two step matching approach in a pooled OLS framework as proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) or Deheija and Wahaba (1999) he controlled for systemic differences in the country pairs. It is argued for an adjusted control group having the same probability of joining a currency union as the treated country pairs. Persson firstly calculated the probability of having a common currency union for all country pairs in the sample. Secondly, the control group was adjusted with regard to the probabilities of the treated country pairs. Non-treated control pairs having a significantly smaller probability of being treated were excluded from the control group. The omitted country pairs were regarded as systematically different from the treated country pairs by endogeneity biases (Ritschl and Wolf 2002 A further step follows Persson (2001) . He first constructs an artificial, more appropriate control group. Table 4 shows systemic differences among treated and non-treated observations. The treated country pairs are smaller, more often speak the same language and more often have a common or similar colonial past. These systematic differences might reflect endogeneity biases in the sample. The combined effect of two regressors on bilateral trade -such as same language and a common colonial past -might be more than the linear sum of their effects. In formal terms this non-linearity reflects the endogeneity biases.
3 These are the 14 Pacific Forum members (Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Marshall Islands, Solomon Islands, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu), the French oversees territories (French Polynesia, New Caledonia and Wallis&Futuna), the British oversees territory (Pitcairn Islands), the New Zealand territory (Tokelau) and the American territory (North Marianna Islands). 4 The principal trading partners of the developing Pacific were selected according to the Asian Development Bank's Key Indicators, 2006. These countries are Australia, China, France, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. 5 The common currency's effect on trade is calculated as exp(coefficient)-1. Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and variances. The standard estimator and the stratification estimator are based on 5-year intervals. The nearest matching estimator is calculated for annual data because of data shortcomings. A common currency coefficient of 0.522 implies that trade between common-currency pairs was exp (0.522)  1.68 times larger than between non common-currency pairs. That means sharing a common currency increases trade by 68 per cent.
Referring to the observable characteristics (all regressors included) of all country pairs, a control group more similar to the treated group was constructed. Similarity was defined by the propensity score, that is, the probability of each country pair adopting a common currency.
The probability values of the logit estimations in the following shape deliver the propensity score for each country pair in the sample:
Table 5 reports the propensity score for the whole sample. Five out of seven regressors taken from equation (2) help to explain the probability of adopting a common currency area. Based on the propensity score two matching estimators being robust to the endogeneity biases are computed -the stratification estimator and the nearest matching estimator. For the stratification estimator we excluded all non-treated country pairs having a lower propensity
score than the lowest score of the treated pairs. In other words all country pairs not having a common currency were excluded if their probability of joining a common currency area was lower than for the treated country pair with the lowest probability value. The excluded observations were viewed as non-comparable to any treated country pair because of reverse causality. The excluded observations account for 748 out of 1037 country pairs in the control group (five-yearly sample). As reported in Table 3 , the stratification estimator yields a highly significant point estimate for the common currency dummy of 1.1. This coefficient implies a trade expansion of about 203 per cent by the adoption of an external currency. Compared to estimation results of the Rose estimator, the stratification estimator is significantly lower but still very large. Even more stringent is the nearest matching estimator. Now, each treated observation is compared with only one non-treated counterfactual. The counterfactual pairs are again matched by the propensity score. Each treated observation is matched with the nearest nontreated observation as measured by the propensity score. 6 If certain controls are the best fit for more than one treated observation, they are applied more than once. To create the nearest matching sample we have built four stratums accounting for a range of propensity score values as proposed by Dehejia and Wahba (1999) . 7 6 Because of data shortcomings we had to apply yearly data for the nearest stratification estimator. Running the nearest matching estimator on the usual five-yearly dataset would have shrunk the sample to 78 observation, that is, the estimation results would not have been significant. As we are concerned with time effects, we ran the Rose estimator for a yearly dataset. Time effects seem not to play a role; the yearly sample and the five-yearly sample give very similar estimation results. 7 Stratum 1 includes observations with p-values being smaller than 0.1. Observations in the further strata range from 0.1 < p < 0.25 (stratum 2), 0.25 < p < 0.5 (stratum 3) and 0.5 < p < 1.0 (stratum 4). The first stratum includes 84 treated and 6931 non-treated observations. The second stratum includes 72 treated observations and 437 non-treated observations. In stratum 3 there are 52 treated and 100 non-treated observations. Stratum 4 includes 40 treated and 16 non-treated observations.
The nearest matching point estimate is 0.5, indicating an expansion of trade by 68 per cent.
The common currency dummy, and most other variables also, are again highly significant.
The nearest matching estimator has again led to less effect on trade. In sum, a clearly positive and significant common currency effect on trade persists for the Pacific after applying endogeneity controls.
Conclusions
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